I. Introduction
The three Arab Gulf states of Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) codified their Muslim law of personal status for the first time in the previous decade, leaving Saudi-Arabia as the only Muslim country in the region without a codified family This is the pre-print version (21 March 2013) of an article which is due for publication in Hawwa -Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2013, Forthcoming. It is published in this Research Paper Series with the permission of the rights owner, Brill, in accordance with its Open Access Policy. Full-text Hawwa Journal 4 Despite differences in the denominations of the local populations in Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, the three new codes resemble each other in many regards. This is, for one, due to the comparative legal research undertaken during the codification processes. Moreover, all three legislators used the "Draft Code of Personal Status" 5 issued by the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1997 as a common frame of reference.
One major area of discussion during the codification process in the UAE were regulations regarding the ḥiḍāna, the divorced mother's right to custody of her minor children. The 2005 Code of Personal Status is, in general, largely based on the Sunni Maliki School of law, and to a lesser extent on the Hanbali School of law. Regulations on the duration of female custodianship (whether the mother or some other eligible woman -see below, II) as well as on the eligibility for custody differ from traditional Maliki and Hanbali law.
The age limits established in respect of the mother's custody of her minor children are the outcome of fiery debates among government representatives, religious scholars, legal practitioners, and women's rights groups during the codification process. Family Law No. 19/2009 [qānūn al-usra (al-qism al-awwal) Law, ed. Bill Atkin, (Bristol: Jordan Publ., 2010) , 163-78. 5 Muscat Document of the GCC Common Law of Personal Status 1997 [al-nizām (al-qānūn) almuwaḥḥad al-aḥwāl al-shakhṣiyya li-duwal 6/10/1997, 6-56. 3/15 discussions regarding legal reforms in this area are still ongoing. They represent the major concern of (mostly governmental) women's rights organizations 6 .
Custody rights represent one area of the new law in which courts still wield substantial discretionary powers. This discretion is verbalized in the term "maṣlaḥat al-maḥḍūn", the welfare of the child whose custody is at issue. According to the new law, the welfare of the child is to be taken into consideration when determining eligibility for custody as well as its duration. This makes an analysis of statutory provisions and judgments regarding the mother's custody of her children in the UAE especially interesting. Judgments in custody cases allude to the broader topic of social and moral values in the UAE as expressed through the courts' interpretation of what determines the welfare of the child. While one of the major aims of the codification of Muslim personal status law in the UAE was to guarantee legal certainty in matters of family law, the new rules on custody do not necessarily serve this purpose. By conceding large discretionary powers to the judiciary whenever the welfare of the child is concerned, the new custody regulations in the 2005 Code of Personal Status diverge from that particular aim.
In what follows, the UAE's pre-codification custody rules will be summarized briefly. Thereafter, the debates which gave rise to the custody regulations currently in force will be outlined. The outcome of the UAE's codification efforts will then be compared to the legal realities that are being created through court rulings in custody cases. Note that non-governmental women's rights organizations do not exist in the UAE. The General Women's Union [al-iṭṭiḥād al-nisāᵓī alc ām] is the official governmental umbrella organization of all organizations concerned with women and family issues in the UAE. The paper at hand is mainly based on findings made by the author during a two-month period of field research in the UAE and other Arab Gulf states in the spring of 2012. Hanbali and Maliki law differ with regard to the person entitled to custody and the duration of female custodianship. All Islamic schools of law hold that the mother, whether living with her husband or divorced, has the first claim to custody of her infant child 12 up to a certain age. 13 If the mother is dead or not suitable, the schools differ widely on the question of who is to follow her in rank.
Failing the mother, the Hanbali School gives priority to the mother's mother how high so ever. Failing the female line of the maternal grandmother, the father is entitled to custody of his infant child. 14 As opposed to these Hanbali rules, the Maliki School of law prefers most female relatives of the child to his/her own father when the mother cannot serve as custodian. The father will only gain custody of his child failing most female maternal relatives as well as some of his own kinswomen, such as his mother and grandmothers. The various Islamic schools of law differ with regard to the duration of female custodianship and infancy is not always defined in terms of age limits. The shortest duration of female custodianship can be found in the Jaafari School of law, which rules that the mother's custody of her male child ends with the weaning of the infant boy. Bakhtiar (above n. 14), 470; Nasir (above n. 14), 160, 161; Ṣuwaynī (above n. 13), 43-6. 5/15 to the age of seven for both, boys and girls. At the age of seven, the Hanbali School gives the child the right to choose which parent he/she wants to live with. 16 In contrast, Maliki law distinguishes between the male and the female child. A son will remain in the custody of his mother until he reaches puberty (bulūġ). 17 A girl will remain in her mother's custody until she consummates her marriage (dukhūl al-zawāj). Malikis do not confer a right of choice upon the child.
18
Traditional Maliki and Hanbali doctrines concur with regard to certain marriage restrictions which the female custodian has to abide by. Both schools (and, in fact, all Sunni and Shi c i schools of law) hold that the female custodian will lose the right to custody should she marry a person who would not be prohibited from marrying the child. The requirement further applies to all children under the custody of a female, regardless of their respective sex 19 . Should the female custodian marry a person who is prohibited from marrying the child under custody, she will however retain custody of the child.
20
As for the custody rights of Christian or Jewish mothers of a Muslim child, the Sunni schools of law differ considerably. While the Shafi c i and (in the case of apostates) the Hanafi rules deny a non-Muslim any right to the custody of a child, the Maliki and Hanbali schools do not consider the religious affiliation of the mother a condition for the allocation of custody.
21
Judgments from the pre-codification period, i.e. until 2005, show that courts in the UAE largely relied on the locally dominant Sunni school of law.
III. Debates on the Codification of Custody Rules
After years of discussion and lobbying by women's rights organizations, the UAE put their first codified family law into force in 2005. On several occasions between the first drafts and the final version, legal scholars, legal practitioners, and the General Women's
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Mājid Abū Rakhiyya and c Abdallah M. Jabūrī, Fiqh al-zawāj wa-l-ṭalāq [The law of marriage and divorce] (Sharjah: Maktabat jāmi c a 2006), 271; Bakhtiar (above n. 14), 472; Nasir (above n. 14), 170, 171.
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Union 22 (GWU) were asked to comment on the various draft versions. One area of conflict was the duration of maternal custodianship. The first draft maintained that the custody of a divorced mother ended at the age of eight years for her son and eleven years for her daughter, at which time the children had to be transferred to the custody of their father.
The GWU and some of the family lawyers and judges who were asked to review the draft and comment on it demanded an extension of these age limits. The GWU wished to adapt the traditional Maliki rules: female custody until the onset of puberty for sons and the consummation of marriage for girls. Other legal practitioners did not go as far but nonetheless argued for a raising of the age limits. The discussion was mainly based on the argument that children, both boys and girls, were in need of their mother's care for a longer period of time than what the first draft contained. All actors involved in the codification process who demanded a revision of the first draft argued that raising the age limits for female custody was primarily in the interest of the child. Among them, the (exclusively female) GWU demanded the longest duration of female custody. The legal practitioners who were asked to review the draft and who demanded extended age limits, but not necessarily in line with Maliki rules as requested by the GWU, were mostly male lawyers and judges. In the end, supporters of an extension of female custodianship won insofar as Article 156 of the 2005 Code of Personal Status raised the current age limits to eleven years for a boy and thirteen years for a girl. However, broader demands of the GWU were not met and the GWU continues to lobby for a reform of the current law and a revision of the rules regarding the duration of female custodianship.
It is noteworthy that during the codification process, the GWU especially hoped to strengthen the divorced mother's custodial rights by extending the duration of female custodianship. Even though this was done with reference to safeguarding the interests of children, the GWU did not argue for an abolishment of fixed age limits for custody altogether. They did not demand an allocation of custody based on an assessment of the child's best interests alone. The GWU thus seems to have accepted the assumption that fixed age limits are an integral part of both traditional Islamic custody rules -as developed in historical fiqh works -and statutory provisions in this area of the new law.
IV. Custody Regulations in the 2005 Code of Personal Status
Regulations regarding custody are dealt with only in Book 2 of the new code, i.e. within the context of the dissolution of marriage. Allocation of custody is considered an effect of divorce. Therefore, the code does not deal with questions of custody within an existing 22 See above n. 6. As mentioned earlier, Article 156 of the 2005 Code of Personal Status regulates the duration of female custodianship. Accordingly, the divorced mother's custody ends upon her son reaching the age of eleven and her daughter the age of thirteen. However, in the interest of the child, the court has authority to extend the custody of the mother until the son reaches puberty/maturity (bulūġ) and the daughter consummates her marriage. The legislator has thus chosen an age limit slightly above that of the Hanbali School of law with a possible extension up to the age which traditional Maliki law commonly maintained.
Custody Regulations in the United Arab Emirates
Regarding the eligibility for custody, the 2005 Code of Personal Status differs from both the Hanbali and the Maliki schools of law. By providing that it is the father who is to follow the mother in rank as entitled custodian, the code focuses on the nuclear family rather than on the presumption that even remote female relatives are to be given priority over the father. The wording of Article 146 thus seems to aim at combining traditional Islamic rules regarding the allocation of custody with the legislator's will to strengthen the father's position as custodian of his child.
Article 143 of the 2005 Code of Personal Status stipulates requirements to be fulfilled by every custodian, such as puberty/maturity, sanity and health. In addition, Article 144 of the 2005 Code of Personal Status contains two separate lists of requirements for women and men. These are to be fulfilled in order to be granted custody of a child. Accordingly, women are prohibited from living with a husband who would not be legally impeded from marrying the child whose custody is at issue. This requirement not only applies in all cases in which the child under custodial care is female, but it also covers boys in the custody of their mother.
26 Moreover, the requirement for the mother to not re-marry (or otherwise lose her right to custody) is frequently inserted as a stipulation in out-of-court custody agreements between spouses seeking a divorce. 27 A similar requirement does not, however, apply to men. Men are only barred from having custody of a girl to whom they do not have a prohibited degree of kinship. When codifying the new custody rules, the legislator did however depart from traditional Islamic law's assumption that there is no exception to the marriage restriction for female custodians. The requirement that a female custodian not be married to a man who, in turn, is not prohibited from marrying the child is not absolute; rather it can be waived whenever a continuation of female custody is considered to be in the best interest of the child. Article 144 also requires a male custodian to be accompanied by a female to support him with the caretaking of the child. Such a woman does not necessarily have to be the wife of the custodian.
An exception to the rules regarding the mother's priority in matters of custody can be found in Article 145 of the 2005 Code of Personal Status. Article 145 discusses the rules of allocation and duration of custody in all cases in which the mother does not have the same religion as the child. Since the new code applies solely to Muslim personal status matters, the only possible constellation will be that of a Christian or Jewish mother and her child from a Muslim father. In these cases, the mother is in principle denied custody altogether. Once again taking into consideration the welfare of the child, the court can grant her custody until the child reaches the age of five. At the same time, the allocation of custody by court decree applies only to a non-Muslim mother. Other females are already barred from serving as a custodian through the general rule of Article 144, requiring women to have the same religion as the child under their custody.
26 Also see pp. 5, 6 above.
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See explanations on pp. 10, 11 below.
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V. Legal Practice and Social Realities
General Tendencies in Emirati Jurisdictions on Custody
Judgments from the pre-codification period show that personal status courts in the different emirates of the UAE did in fact generally adhere to the principles of their respective school of law. 28 At the same time, judges were not bound to one particular school of law and would as well pass judgments in accordance with whatever rules of Islamic law they saw fit for the case. It can be assumed that litigants would frequent a judge of their respective school of law and that judges would generally apply the rules of the particular school of law to which the litigants belonged. At the same time, the absence of codified (procedural) law did allow for more flexibility in this regard.
10/15 marriage rests on the mother. If her husband deems her unsuitable, it is upon him to establish that claim before the court.
30
As opposed to the aforementioned judgment, which deals with the question of custody within an existing marriage, a first review of judgments collected from intermediate and final instance appellate courts in the UAE shows that the majority of custody cases tried in court concern the custodial rights of divorced mothers. Among these, the most frequent are cases concerning a mother remarried to a man who is not related to the child and the extension of female custodianship beyond the statutory age limits. At the same time, the commentary does not explain why the particular ages at which children are to be transferred into the custody of their father were chosen. It is however stated that the legislator "did not intend to decide which school of law best reflects the love of the mother or the love of the father". Instead, the legislator settled upon the custodian according to what it considers best for the social upbringing and the education of boys and girls respectively. The commentary goes on to explain that it would not be fair to assume that the father is always cruel and oppressive while the mother is loving and caring. 34 This reasoning can be regarded as a small step toward the Tunisian approach. Tunisia is the only Arab-Muslim country which distanced itself from the assumption of the mother being the "natural custodian of her children" 35 
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Tunisian Code of Personal Status maintains that the decision about who is to be assigned custody should be based exclusively on the interest of the child.
36
Judgments regarding the extension of female custodianship indicate that courts are indeed willing to extend the statutory age limits whenever the mother is the custodian. It is also noteworthy that when the custody of the mother is extended, it is usually up to the very limits of the law, i.e. puberty for boys and consummation of marriage for girls. The author did not come across a single judgment that ordered a termination of female custody at an age between the two statutory guidelines. The Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation also clarified at which age puberty/maturity is to be assumed. In a judgment on the extension of the mother's custody for her son, the court ruled that puberty is to be understood as meaning 18 years of age. 37 This is in conformity to Article 30 of the 2005
Code of Personal Status which -in line with international agreements to which the UAE is a signatory state 38 -establishes 18 (lunar) years as the age at which puberty can be assumed as a prerequisite for entering into marriage. While, according to Article 144 of the 2005 Code of Personal Status, a woman will in principle lose custody if she remarries a man who is not related to the child to a degree prohibiting marriage, the Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation decided to the contrary in a 2010 case. Pursuant to the judgment, the mother retained custody of her son as the court established that the existing marriage to the unrelated man did not cause harm to the boy. It was further determined that a continuation of the mother's custody was of greater benefit to the child's welfare than a transfer into his father's custody. 40 The former husband of the child's mother claimed custody of his son. As he had also remarried after their divorce, he had a woman to assist him with the upbringing of his son. A second case before the UAE High Court further illustrates the courts' use of judicial discretion with regard to the allocation of custody. In 2006, the UAE High Court granted custody of five minor children, all boys aged five to fourteen to a mother, although she had previously been convicted of a so-called "crime against honor." 41 Specifically, her husband had divorced her in 2004 after he found her in private with an unrelated man in their marital home. After the divorce, the former husband initially took custody of his five minor children, some of whom had mental and physical disabilities. In order to care for the children properly, his mother, the children's paternal grandmother, took up residence with them. The children's mother filed a law suit against her former husband to have the children handed over into her custody. In order to establish the mother's ability to care for the children as well as her bond with them, the Court of First Instance had already interviewed employees at a facility for children with special needs that worked with the family. The facility's staff testified to the mother's strong affection for her children and her ability to raise them. The Court of First Instance held in favour of the mother; this ruling was later confirmed by the UAE High Court. The court maintained that it was within the Court of First Instance's competence to establish what was in the welfare of the child and that the court's reasoning was without flaw. A strong bond between the mother and the children was of utmost importance for their welfare. Since the mother had the ability to raise her children, as testified by the staff of the facility for children with special needs, the court did not see any reason to transfer the children back into their father's custody. The mother's custodianship was thus confirmed despite her previous conviction for a crime against honor. The court argued that the welfare of the child outweighed the father's legitimate claim for custody of his children. 14/15
VI. Conclusion
Custody was and remains one of the most contested issues in the debates on codifying and, subsequently, reforming Muslim personal status law in the UAE. Women's rights groups continue to push for an extension of female custodianship.
Judgments of intermediate appellate and high courts in the UAE have closed some of the gaps which the 2005 Code of Personal Status contained. For example, the age at which puberty/maturity is to be assumed and the question of custody within an existing marriage have been clarified by the courts.
While the text of the code reflects a division of parenting functions along gender lines and a curtailment of the rights that traditional Islamic law granted mothers in the precodification period, the courts have shown considerable flexibility in applying the new law. An analysis of judgments suggests that judges make use of the large discretion that the code grants them. Thus, courts use all the statutory options afforded them, such as deviations from age limits for female custodianship and the approval of the mother's custody regardless of her subsequent marriage to a man who is not prohibited from marrying the child under custodial care.
What is noteworthy, though, is that the courts' definition of the welfare of the child mostly remains vague. Similar to the statutory provisions in the 2006 Family Code of Qatar, courts in the UAE frequently name the affection for the child as well as the ability to raise him/her as indicators of the child's welfare. These factors are, however, difficult to measure. Courts in the UAE have thus far refrained from defining a clear frame of reference for establishing the welfare of the child. Moreover, a review of court rulings in the area of custody proves that even after the codification, the large judicial discretion of the pre-codification period prevails. Thus, judgments in custody cases from the pre-and the post-codification period do not differ significantly.
The 2005 Code of Personal Status did establish fixed age limits as well as conditions to be fulfilled by the custodian, but the new law also grants the courts authority to decide to the contrary, mostly whenever such a deviating judgment is considered to be in the best interest of the child. The aforegoing analysis showed that courts make use of their discretionary powers on a regular basis. Legal certainty is only achieved to the extent that one knows that the courts will necessarily have to resort to considering the welfare of the child when deciding on the allocation of custody. At the same time, it can be argued that by allowing for judicial discretion, the 2005 Code of Personal Status succeeds in retaining a distinctive feature of uncodified Islamic law, namely its flexibility. Within the context of custody, such flexibility allows the law to accommodate to changing societal needs and values. Only seven years after the codification of Muslim personal status law, 15/15 the Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation disagreed with one of the principles of traditional Islamic custody rules, i.e. the requirement that the female custodian not marry a man not related to the child to a degree prohibiting marriage, or else lose custody. This indicates that current custody rules as well as their application in the UAE do indeed adapt to changing social and moral values. Therefore, instead of arguing for raising the fixed age limits for a divorced mother's custody, allocating custody based entirely on the welfare of the child (an approach based on the Tunisian model) might eventually bring about more gender equality than a focus exclusively on strengthening the mother's position.
Summary
One major area of discussion during the 2005 process of initially codifying Muslim personal status law in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were regulations regarding the divorced mother's right to custody of her minor children. The new rules regarding the allocation and duration of female custodianship are the outcome of fiery debates among various actors involved in the codification process. The new codified custody rules differ from traditional Islamic law and concede large discretionary powers to the judiciary. The courts' discretion in allocating custody is verbalized in the term "maṣlaḥat al-maḥḍūn" (the welfare of the child under custody). At the same time, courts in the UAE have thus far refrained from defining in clear terms what actually constitutes the child's welfare. While one of the major aims of the codification of Muslim personal status law in the UAE was to guarantee legal certainty, the reformed custody regulations do not serve this purpose. They rather point towards the legislator's will to put in force more flexible rules on custody which allow for the accommodation of changing societal needs and values.
